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Reassessing the accountability of EU decentralized agencies: Mind the 
Independence Gap 
 
Professor Steve Peers* and Dr Marios Costa** 
 
Abstract  
 
This article examines two recent developments to ensure accountability and 
independence of the EU’s decentralized agencies: the ‘Common Approach’ adopted 
by the EU’s political institutions, and the ESMA judgment on the validity of the rules 
delegating extensive power to an EU agency. The article argues that first of all, the 
Common Approach strengthens the accountability and independence of EU 
agencies, yet it is not being sufficiently implemented and as such it fails to mitigate 
the accountability and independence deficits inherent in EU agencies. Secondly, it 
argues that ESMA strengthens the independence of the EU’s financial authorities at 
the expense of failing to address the existing accountability problem. On the whole, 
these developments are disappointing and fall far short of ensuring a coherent and 
effective system for safeguarding the agencies’ accountability and independence. 
Keywords: Agencies, accountability, independence, legitimacy, delegation, Europol, 
Common Approach 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The inadequacies of the EU decentralized agencies’ regime have been subject to 
severe criticism on grounds of lack of accountability and transparency.1 However, 
the literature has not addressed fully the clear distinction that must be made with 
regards to accountability and independence; the dichotomy between the two terms 
clarifies many of the inadequacies inherent in the agencies’ governance regime. This 
article explains this distinction and then explores the tension between the two 
concepts in the context of two important recent developments on this issue, 
stemming from the EU’s political institutions, on the one hand, and the EU judiciary, 
on the other.  
In particular, in 2008 the Commission responded to the critics and called for a series 
of measures to provide ‘clarity about [the agencies'] role, and about the mechanisms 
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to ensure the accountability of these public bodies’.2 ‘Accountability’ is frequently 
repeated (eight times) within the communication, yet ‘independence’ is heavily 
neglected and mentioned once without any further explanation. Following the 
communication on the governance of agencies, the Council, the Commission and the 
European Parliament (EP) agreed in June 2012 on a non-binding Common 
Approach aiming to update the governance of decentralized agencies.3 Have these 
standard rules remedied accountability and independence deficits as regards 
decentralized agencies in practice? If so, to what extent? As we shall see, although 
the Common Approach aims to strengthen the accountability as well as the 
independence of decentralized agencies, discussions on the proposed new 
governance regime for Europol provides clear evidence that the Common Approach  
is not being sufficiently implemented in all cases, as regards either accountability or 
independence.  
On the judicial front, the judgment of the Court of Justice in ESMA 4  in effect 
authorizes the EU political institutions to rely primarily upon the independent financial 
authorities in order to secure the much needed high quality financial regulation in the 
Eurozone, but nevertheless neglects those authorities’ accountability.5 As a result, 
ESMA raises broader constitutional issues concerning the powers that can be 
lawfully exercised by the EU’s decentralized financial agencies, and arguably by 
analogy by all the other EU independent organs.  However, with all due respect, the 
Court does not impose any limits on the delegation of broad discretionary tasks to 
decentralized bodies and in consequence it contributes little to remedy the lack of an 
accountability mechanism.  
Taking these developments together, then, the EU institutions have not done enough 
to ensure accountability and independence of the agencies in recent years. These 
issues can only be fully understood in light of a conceptual understanding of the 
terms, which we provide first.  
2. Accountability and independence 
 
Assessing whether agencies’ governance suffers from accountability deficits, along 
with examining alternatives on how to mitigate these deficits, presupposes a clear 
understanding of the meaning of accountability. The definition adopted and 
explained here is used throughout this paper as a tool for measuring accountability 
(deficits) in relation to EU decentralized agencies and highlights the reasons why 
more accountability is being called for in this area.  There is a plethora of literature 
on accountability, particularly in the area of political science, but nevertheless this 
comprehensive body of work fails to differentiate accountability from the notion of 
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independence. Most commentators focus on the challenge of finding the right (fine) 
balance between accountability and independence. 6  In doing so, the existing 
literature considers independence as a factor or rather as a threat which may have a 
negative impact upon accountability.7 Given the lack of a statutory definition with 
regards to both terms, this section explains the term ‘independence’ as well as 
‘accountability’. 
 
Independence is an external yet a significant factor relating to accountability. The 
apparent consensus is that accountability cannot co-exist with independence and 
that independence overload leads to a non-accountable agent. Similarly, when the 
accountability forum is constantly steering the behavior of the agent the 
accountability gap is drastically diminished. Yet, the autonomy of the agent under 
these circumstances is non-existent and the outcome is to have an ‘accountable’ but 
rather a dependent agent. We therefore argue for the contrary. We consider that the 
person or the body under scrutiny, the actor, needs to be accountable and 
simultaneously independent throughout the decision-making process. As a result, 
the accountability relationship can be effective so long as the delegator does not 
directly interfere in the decentralized decision-making process. After all, 
accountability can be meaningful if the agent takes decisions by relying on highly 
complicated and technical scientific knowledge and expertise.8 When the actions of 
the agent are directed by the delegator, the raison d’être of delegation defeats its 
purpose. In consequence, we consider that conceptually accountability and 
independence are interrelated terms and not mutually exclusive. Overall, the whole 
essence of accountability calls for independence from politics while the actor 
executes delegated tasks. A key role exercised by agencies is the technical and up-
to-date scientific expertise that they provide for complex matters. They adopt critical 
decisions that will have little or no use if they are substantially influenced by their 
political masters.  
 
2.1. Unquestionable thirst for more accountability at the EU and National level  
 
As already explained above, accountability is a term thoroughly covered in 
contemporary legal and political literature. The word ‘crops up everywhere 
performing all manner of analytical and rhetorical tasks and carrying most of the 
burdens of democratic ‘governance.’9 Similarly, in the context of the EU, ‘we live in 
the age of accountability, wherever one looks there is a discussion and debate over 
accountability.’ 10  But nevertheless, there is no consensus as regards the core 
meaning of accountability per se. In fact, there seems to be as many definitions of 
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accountability as there are scholars.11 There is consensus, however, relating to the 
functioning of accountability as a ‘... mechanism that makes powerful institutions 
responsive to their particular publics’.12 Indeed, accountability is meant to keep a 
democratic check upon actions of those exercising public power to ensure that the 
preferences of the voters are translated into policy. It also safeguards that the terms 
on which political power is authorised are duly observed while ensuring that 
decision-makers do not enjoy unlimited autonomy but have to explain and justify 
their decisions.13 There is, therefore, ‘an unquestionable thirst for accountability that 
cuts across the political spectrum’.14 Where public policy does not correspond to the 
ultimate preferences of the people or in cases of wrongdoings and maladministration 
accountability mechanisms come into effect. In consequence, we can describe this 
as the core meaning of accountability which relates in its fundamental sense to the 
fact that there is a strong need for the public to know how public money is spent and 
to receive assurances that it has been well spent. Finally, accountability’s alter ego, 
transparency, ensures and requires accessibility of all the relevant information by 
taking decisions out of the backroom.15 Doing so, freedom of information and access 
to documents rules constitute a pre-requisite of the accountability relationship. 
 
Additionally, it is also necessary to differentiate the notion of accountability from that 
of control. The latter can be understood as a ‘periodic checking and examination of 
the activities of public officials by external actors possessed of formal or 
constitutional authority to investigate, to grant quietus or to censure, and in some 
cases even to punish.’16 Accountability, however, mainly has to do with wrongdoings 
that happened in the past as well as by preventing failures from happening again. On 
the contrary, ongoing control mechanisms may, on the surface, increase 
accountability of the actor, as already explained above, at the expense of sacrificing 
the agent’s independence since the choices of the actor are replaced by those of the 
forum. Replacing the choices of the actor is nevertheless self-defeating since the 
very purpose of the agent presupposes the exercise of autonomous decision-making 
powers that remain free from any external pressure. Constitutionally the role of the 
accountability forum is to constrain the actor by securing that the limits of delegation 
are respected at all times as well as to ensure, in any case, that the choices of the 
delegatee are not replaced by those of the forum. 
 
Legal autonomy is also required by the founding measures of secondary legislation 
establishing agencies. Most of the regulations provide clearly that the execution of 
the agent’s duties must be independent from any political considerations and free 
from any external influence.17 However, empirical research carried out during 2007 
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indicates that at least some of the EU agencies are not independent in practice. The 
research findings revealed that the Commission can restrict the formal autonomy 
granted to EU agencies by exercising on-going controls which in most of the cases 
relate to threatening not to fund some of the agency’s proposed projects from the 
EU’s general budget (as distinct from the agency’s own budget).18 Consequently, in 
practice and behind the scene, the accountability forum although in principle 
entrusted to secure the limits of delegation, pragmatically is exercising contra legem 
control powers at the cost of reducing the agent’s independence.  
 
What follows from this discussion is the threefold requirements of accountability. 
Firstly, accountability requires the existence of an external relationship amongst at 
least two different bodies, in the sense that the accountability holder can scrutinize 
the accountability holdee, who may then suffer the consequences where appropriate. 
Secondly, the overall process presupposes the existence of interaction and the 
exchange of information between the accountability holder and the holdee. 
Throughout this process, the accountability holder is entrusted with the task of 
questioning the accountability holdee. In consequence, we consider that the 
accountability mechanism can only operate when there is sufficient and accurate 
information available in order for the assessment exercise to take place. Thirdly, the 
holdee is required to explain as well as to ‘undertake to put matters right if it should 
appear that errors have been made. In other words, [accountability] is explanatory 
and amendatory.’19 
  
Overall, in its fundamental sense accountability means being answerable to some 
form of an authority and, if necessary, having to suffer sanctions for actions adopted 
not in accordance with the mandate granted by that authority. In other words, ‘A is 
accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A’s (past or future) actions and 
decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual 
misconduct’.20 In concrete terms, this form of accountability can be said to break 
down into four major elements: the setting of standards, the obtaining of an account, 
the judging of such an account and a decision about the consequences that arise 
from such a judgment.21 As a result, the conditions of delegation need to be set out 
from the beginning so that accountability does not affect the agent’s independence.  
 
In order to appreciate the problem of accountability in the field of delegation of tasks 
to non-majoritarian agencies we need to consider no more than the core meaning of 
accountability. As already explained above, accountability requires that the powers 
of rule-making organizations are connected with a democratically elected parliament 
as ‘appointed bodies enjoying a degree of independence from elected politicians are 
viewed as democratically suspicious at best and, at worst, democratically 
illegitimate’. 22  Yet, the development of effective accountability mechanisms that 
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restrain the unlimited exercise of broad discretionary tasks should mitigate, in 
principle, legal objections against the proliferation of agencies.  
 
3. Mushrooming of EU agencies  
 
EU decentralized agencies23 are defined as ‘independent bodies, entrusted by the 
European [Union] institutions with one or several tasks which they undertake under 
their own responsibility’. 24  The Community (as it was then) established the first 
generation of agencies in the mid-1970s. Most agencies were, however, created in 
the early 1990s, and their number almost doubled in the early 2000s.25 Agencies’ 
functions vary from the collection of information and delivery of opinions and 
recommendations, to the carrying out of inspections and investigations. More 
importantly, in some cases agencies are granted decision-making powers. Agencies 
possessing this latter function have the power to adopt binding decisions which may 
have adverse effects on individuals, regulators and Member States. 26  These 
agencies are usually referred to, mostly by the Commission, as decentralized 
agencies and are considered to be highly specialized, autonomous and 
independent.27 It would be misleading to argue that the technique of delegating tasks 
to agencies is something entirely new.28 What is new, however, is their massive 
expansion.  
 
The main EU institutions from their inception, in particular the Commission and the 
Council, have extensively used the opportunity of delegation to external committees 
in order to carry out specific tasks, usually requiring highly specialised knowledge 
and/or scientific expertise.29 From the very beginning (1960), the Council, the only 
legislator at the time, lacked extensive, detailed knowledge and the technical and 
scientific expertise required for the implementation of highly complicated legislative 
measures. It was also not possible for the Council to agree quickly and efficiently on 
all the technical requirements needed for every single piece of legislation due to 
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workload limitations.30 Delegation of the non-essential elements of legislation to the 
Commission was seen as a solution to mitigate these problems. However, delegation 
by the principal (in this case, the Council) to the agent (in this case, the Commission) 
can only be said to be desirable as long as the principal retains control powers to 
monitor how the agent is carrying out its delegated tasks. Loss of power by the 
Council is a sufficient reason to consider delegation as undesirable.31 The leading 
cases on this point are the old Meroni case, and now (since January 2014) the 
ESMA judgment.32  
 
The Council (by definition an intergovernmental institution) feared that delegation 
would see the supranational Commission acting contrary to the interests of the 
Member States when exercising its implementing powers. The Council therefore 
wished to exercise effective control over the Commission to limit, as far as possible, 
the Commission’s discretionary powers and to ensure that the implementing 
measures reflected the opinions of the Member States.33 It was the consideration of 
the Member States’ interests that led to the birth of the pre Lisbon comitology 
committees.  
 
Equally, agencies’ development aimed to reduce some of the Council’s and the 
Commission’s administrative tasks, allowing them to concentrate on their major 
strategic policies. With more than thirty decentralized agencies established at the 
time of writing, it is clear that ‘[t]he creation of European agencies is one of the most 
remarkable institutional developments at the EU level in recent years’.34 For a long 
time, there was no explicit mention in the EC/EU Treaties of decentralized agencies 
in general.  The lack of a constitutional legal basis, which would have subjected 
agencies to a number of guarantees, increased the criticism about agencies’ 
accountability,35 but did not prevent their mushrooming. Article 308 EC Treaty,36 
post-Lisbon Article 352 TFEU, was initially frequently used as a basis for the 
establishment of agencies. However, the recent tendency is to use a more specific 
provision.37  
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The Treaty of Lisbon remedied this deficit by integrating agencies into the Treaties 
and replaced references to ‘institutions (and/or bodies)’ with references to 
‘institutions, bodies, offices or agencies’.  Notably, Article 15 TFEU on the right of 
access to documents and Article 228 TFEU on the right to file complaints to the 
European Ombudsman explicitly apply to EU agencies. Pursuant to Articles 263 and 
267 TFEU and to Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental rights the Court of Justice 
has jurisdiction to review the legality of acts adopted by agencies.  
 
The extent to which agencies are empowered to adopt binding decisions raises 
significant questions regarding agencies’ compliance with the fundamental principle 
of subsidiarity,38 particularly whether the same level of optimal regulation through the 
adoption of national standards could be better achieved at the domestic level. If so, 
regulation at the supranational level is not justified. In the case of the EU’s recently 
created financial agencies, in light of the current financial crisis it is very hard to 
imagine a scenario with cross-border implications threatening the stability of the 
whole or part of the euro system which could be better resolved through the adoption 
of national standards. This means that, again, the necessity of having these 
agencies cannot be neglected: agencies may lead to better efficiency; they carry out 
highly complicated tasks requiring knowledge and scientific expertise all of which 
results to better allocation of resources.39 In any case, the delegation of powers 
should not distort the accountability framework as defined by the Court in the 
Meroni40 and ESMA41 judgments. The CJEU ruled that delegation to autonomous 
bodies of wide discretionary powers presupposes the exercise of public power and 
cannot be accepted. Agencies’ decision-making process should be limited to the 
drafting of technical standards and not relate to the balancing of broad discretionary 
tasks or relate to the exercise of a wide margin of appreciation which can disturb the 
institutional balance provided by the Treaty framework. If that happens then 
delegation ‘…replaces the choices of the delegator by the choices of the delegate, 
[and] brings about an actual transfer of responsibility’.42  
 
4. Assessment of Accountability and Independence 
 
In the context of the EU, the need for accountability and independence in the field of 
agencies is augmented by the ‘democratic deficit’ which some have argued exists 
within the EU at various levels.43 Members of the EU institutions, offices, bodies and 
agencies - with the notable exception of the EP - are not elected directly by the 
people and can removed from their positions only in the most extreme 
circumstances. While accountability within the EU context is often characterised as a 
principle for an era of innovative governance, a common statement by many 
commentators is that, not only is the EU not accountable enough but that 
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accountability deficits are even growing, compromising the legitimacy of the EU.44 
The proliferation of EU agencies in diverse fields raised, unsurprisingly, significant 
questions about the overall accountability of the EU. The apparent concerns 
highlighted the pressing need for the development of mechanisms to secure 
agencies’ accountability in the sense that ‘no one controls [agencies], yet [they are] 
under control’.45 Nevertheless, agencies have been heavily criticized in the literature 
as ‘uncontrollable centres of arbitrary power’.46   
 
From a legal point of view, agencies are separate entities distinct from the EU 
institutions, with their own legal personalities. As already explained above, agencies’ 
independence requires carrying out related tasks efficiently while simultaneously 
remaining autonomous. 47  In consequence, the EU institutions need to exercise 
sufficient control over agencies but ‘…cannot give instructions to agencies or oblige 
them to withdraw certain decisions. Quite the contrary, they are given considerable 
legal, budgetary and operational autonomy. Precisely because of this autonomy, 
agencies must be held responsible directly for their actions...’. 48  Agencies are 
therefore expected to perform their tasks independently from their political masters, 
something which safeguards their policies and grants them a degree of immunity 
against external pressure.49  In the words of the Commission, ‘[t]he main advantage 
of using the agencies is that their decisions are based on purely technical 
evaluations of very high quality and are not influenced by political or contingent 
considerations’.50  
 
Giandomenico Majone, a strong supporter of EU agencies, argued that delegation to 
independent bodies is democratically justified only in the sphere of efficiency issues 
where reliance on expertise is clearly more important than direct political 
accountability.51 Majone also argues that the Commission only needs to identify the 
relevant areas in which further regulation is needed and leave the details on how 
technical decentralized issues are implemented to agencies. 52  Notably, these 
findings fit uneasily with the Meroni and also the recent ESMA line of reasoning. The 
conferment of extensive discretionary power reconciling competing public interests 
cannot, in any case, be justified on the basis of scientific expertise. In the wording of 
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the judiciary ‘[s]cientific legitimacy is not a sufficient basis for the exercise of public 
authority’. 53  Delegation of tasks to agencies presupposes the existence of 
appropriate control mechanisms circumscribing agencies’ actions to a number of 
procedural and substantive constraints.  
 
4.1. Assessment of the new governance regime  
 
In 2005, the Commission proposed an inter-institutional agreement on the 
governance of decentralized agencies.54 The negotiations between the Commission, 
the Council and the EP on this proposal did not come to fruition and in 2008 the 
Commission withdrew it.  However, after three years of negotiations, these three 
institutions eventually agreed upon the adoption of a ‘Common Approach’ on EU 
agencies, attached to a Joint Statement of the Commission, the EP and the Council 
adopted in July 2012.55 This Common Approach does not apply to CFSP agencies 
or to Commission agencies with no decision-making powers. 
 
The Joint Statement acknowledges that the Common Approach is not binding, but 
states that the institutions ‘will take the Common Approach into account’ as regards 
all future discussions on decentralized agencies, ‘following a case-by-case analysis’.  
In order to implement the Common Approach, the Commission was asked to present 
a roadmap by the end of 2012, and inform the EP and the Council regularly on the 
implementation of this roadmap, first of all at the end of 2013. This follow-up process 
is discussed further below.  
 
4.1.1. Content of the Common Approach  
 
The Common Approach sets out 66 points in five sections, addressing in turn: the 
role and position of agencies in the institutional landscape (section I, points 1 to 9); 
the structure and governance of agencies (section II, points 10 to 22); the operation 
of agencies (section III, points 23 to 26); the programming of activities and resources 
(section IV, points 27 to 44); and agencies’ accountability, control and transparency 
(section V, points 45 to 66). The following summary focusses on the issues which 
are the most relevant for the topics of this paper. 
 
First, as for the structure and governance of agencies (section II of the common 
approach), the Common Approach provides for a standard composition for agencies’ 
Management Boards (point 10), which are a significant means of ensuring the 
agencies’ accountability. They should have one representative from each Member 
State, two representatives from the Commission, one representative from the EP 
and a ‘fairly limited’ number of representatives from stakeholders. But the provisions 
on representatives from the EP and Commission are ‘without prejudice’ to existing 
rules, and the provisions on the EP and stakeholders apply ‘where appropriate’. 
Board members should be appointed for renewable periods of four years, and all 
parties should try to limit their turnover, in order to enhance agencies’ efficiency. 
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Appointments should be made in light of the board members’ knowledge of 
agencies’ core business, taking into account their management, administrative and 
budgetary skills. Where their efficiency would be enhanced, agencies should have a 
two-tier management structure, with the Management Board limited to providing 
‘general orientations’ for the agency’s activities and a ‘small-sized Executive Board’, 
with a Commission representative present, more closely involved in supervising the 
agency’s activities. 
 
The Directors of agencies should be responsible for administrative management and 
implementation of the agencies’ duties, ‘in particular’ as regards implementation of 
work programmes and budget and staffing decisions (point 14). They are 
accountable ‘first and foremost’ to Management Boards, to whom they submit annual 
reports, as well as to the EP and Council via the annual discharge procedure. Each 
Director should be appointed by the Management Board on the basis of a shortlist 
drawn up by the Commission (point 16). The shortlist should be drawn up following a 
‘transparent selection procedure that guarantees a rigorous evaluation of candidates 
and a high level of independence’, but there can be exceptions to this procedure ‘if 
justified in specific cases’. There should be a procedure, mirroring the appointment 
procedure, for dismissal of a Director ‘in the event of misconduct, unsatisfactory 
performance or recurring/serious irregularities’ (point 19). The Common Approach 
does not establish standard terms of office for Directors, but rather refers to the acts 
founding the agencies on this point. A Director’s term may be extended once, if the 
Director has performed well (point 17).  
 
Agencies’ scientific committees should improve their functioning (point 20), in 
particular as regards the independence of experts and the selection criteria for them. 
The same applies to the selection of Boards of Appeal, and there should be ‘great 
care’ appointing an agency’s staff to such boards (point 21).  
 
As for the accountability of the agencies’ activities, the provisions on the 
programming of activities and resources (section IV) require that agencies draw up 
annual work programmes (point 27) and multi-annual programmes (point 28).56 The 
Commission should be consulted and issue advice on both documents, while the EP 
should be consulted on the multi-annual programmes, provided that its opinion is not 
binding; the practice of agency Directors presenting the annual programme to the EP 
should continue (point 29).  
 
Finally, the points on agencies’ accountability, control and transparency (section V) 
start with rules on reporting. Reporting requirements should be streamlined, with only 
one annual report in principle (point 46). Each annual report should describe the 
implementation of the work programme, along with detailed information on staff and 
budget issues (point 47). Moreover, to aid comparison, the annual reports from the 
agencies should have a common structure, based on a template to be drawn up by 
the Commission (point 48). There should also be common rules on the process of 
drawing these reports up (point 49). The Common Approach then sets out detailed 
rules on auditing and discharge of the budget (points 50-58).  
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According to point 59 of the Common Approach, there should be an ‘alert/warning 
system’, which the Commission can use if it has ‘serious reasons for concern that an 
agency’s Management Board is about to take decisions which may not comply with 
the mandate of the agency, may violate EU law or be in manifest contradiction with 
EU policy objectives’. In that case, the Commission may request the Management 
Board of that agency not to take the relevant decision. If the board does not suspend 
the decision, the Commission will inform the EP and the Council with the intention of 
reacting quickly. The Common Approach does not spell out what form this reaction 
would take, or refer to judicial review in this context. These provisions obviously aim 
to strike a delicate balance between accountability and independence, providing for 
control by one of the EU’s political institutions in highly limited cases.  
 
To ensure long-term accountability, overall evaluations of agencies should take 
place five years after they begin operations, and every five years thereafter. The 
sunset/review clause should apply on the occasion of every other overall evaluation, 
and the idea of a common template for evaluations should be explored (point 60). 
There should be evaluations in advance of major agency programmes and activities, 
and ex-post evaluations of all such programmes and activities (point 61). To 
implement the conclusions of these evaluations, each agency should prepare a 
roadmap with an action plan, and report bi-annually on its implementation to the 
Commission (point 62).  
 
On the issue of transparency, the Common Approach states simply that agencies’ 
websites should be as multilingual as possible (point 63). Relations with 
stakeholders should be clarified, and stakeholders should have a role either on the 
agency’s Management Board, or in the agency’s internal bodies or advisory/working 
groups (point 64).  
 
To follow up the Common Approach, the Commission first of all produced a ‘road 
map’ at the end of 2012, which mainly reiterated the main content of the institutions’ 
agreement. 57  The Commission committed itself to propose amendments to the 
legislation establishing agencies which reflected the agreement – but only in the 
event that it was proposing a broader set of amendments to that legislation.  
 
Subsequently, the Commission reported on the implementation of the Common 
Approach at the end of 2013.58 The report indicated (inter alia) that: there would 
soon be common rules on consolidated reporting on budgets and work programmes; 
the ‘alert-warning’ system had not yet been used; and the Commission had proposed 
amendments to seven agencies’ founding legislation, taking account of the Common 
Approach.59  
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However, the Council’s and EP’s positions on those amendments do not necessarily 
reflect the Common Approach. A good example of this is the negotiation of new 
legislation governing Europol, the EU’s police intelligence agency. 60 Many of the 
proposed amendments reflect agreements in the Common Approach, but one or 
both of the Council and the EP reject them nevertheless. For instance, as regards 
Europol’s management board, the Commission proposed (in accordance with the 
Common Approach) that it have two representatives, alongside one from each 
Member State. However, both the EP and Council want to cut this back to one 
representative (as at present). Moreover, the EP (based on the Common Approach) 
proposes to let an observer from its Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group (see below) 
attend meetings of the Management Board. Both the EP and the Council want to 
drop the proposed clause (based on the Common Approach) which would require 
Member States to limit turnover in the Board, even though this provision obviously 
aims to guarantee the independence of the agency.  
 
Next, the Council and Commission agree that (in accordance with the Common 
Approach) members of the Management Board should have standard terms of four 
years. However, the EP wants their term of office to be set by each Member State, 
again possibly limiting their independence. 
 
Furthermore, the Council wants the chair of the Management Board to come (as at 
present) from one of the three Member States which is jointly holding the Council 
Presidency, whereas the Commission and the EP reject this. The link to the Council 
would give the impression that independence could be compromised. Finally, to 
increase accountability, the EP wants all members of the Management Board to sign 
a declaration of interests, for such declarations to be published, and for the 
Commission to have the power to object to draft Management Board decisions on 
fundamental legal or policy grounds. These proposals are based on the Common 
Approach. 
 
Also, the Council wants to retain its current powers to appoint Europol’s Executive 
Director and the Deputy Executive Directors, instead of shifting this power to the 
Management Board as the Commission proposes, to ensure their independence in 
accordance with the Common Approach on agencies (the EP agrees with the 
Commission). But the Council does not want to share this power with the EP.  
 
As for parliamentary accountability, currently, the EP can receive reports on Europol, 
plays a role as regards the budget, is consulted upon implementing measures and 
can hold hearings with the Director. Due to concerns about ensuring more effective 
parliamentary accountability for Europol’s actions, the Commission proposed a 
number of reforms, in particular sending the EP and national parliaments more 
reports, and involving the EP more in the process of choosing the (Executive) 
Director. 
 
In response, the Council insists upon separate references to the EP and national 
parliaments. It would also delete many of the proposed powers for the EP, in 
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particular dropping the proposed obligation for the Executive Director to report to the 
EP and the obligation for the candidate to be Executive Director to make a statement 
before the EP. 
 
Conversely, the EP would enhance the parliamentary role in the Regulation, in 
particular by creating a Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group, which would comprise 
members of both the EP and national parliaments. In its view, references to the EP 
in the proposal should be replaced by references to this group. There would also be 
greater powers for the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group as regards the process of 
appointing the Executive Director.  
 
Overall, in some respects the Council position seeks to go backwards, by eliminating 
any role for the EP questioning the Executive Director. This flies in the face of the 
specific reference to parliamentary accountability in the Treaties as regards Europol 
(see Article 88 TFEU), given the obvious importance that parliamentary questioning 
of an agency director can play in ensuring that body’s accountability. 
 
The Council’s attempts to defend the status quo can also be seen in its approach to 
the appointment of the (Executive) Director and the composition and chairing of the 
Management Board. The more modern approach of the EP as regards declarations 
of interests and scrutiny by the Commission should be preferred. Furthermore, 
accountability surely demands a single parliamentary observer on the Management 
Board, given that 28 Member States will each have a voting member to advocate 
their interests. 
 
It is striking that three years after agreeing standard rules on EU agencies, in a bid to 
forestall future conflicts and difficult negotiations, all three political institutions have 
taken a ‘pick and mix’ approach to the Common Approach, each selecting certain 
points that they like from these common principles and rejecting those which they 
dislike. 
 
5. The judicial dimension: accountability of the EU’s financial agencies 
 
Has the latest contribution of the Court of Justice as regards the accountability of EU 
agencies been more successful than the political institutions’ initiative at enhancing 
that accountability?  
 
In 2010 we witnessed the establishment of three European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs): the European Banking Authority; the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority; and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).  
They were set up by the Union to exercise highly independent but purely 
technocratic decision-making powers. In particular, the ESAs were established to 
increase and centralize financial supervision at the EU level. The CJEU was asked 
to rule on the validity of more recent legislation empowering ESMA to adopt legally 
binding measures upon financial institutions of the Member States in the event of a 
threat to the proper functioning of the financial market or to the stability of the 
15 
financial system of the EU.61 More precisely, the UK requested the annulment of 
Article 28 of Regulation 236/2012, which confers power upon ESMA power to ban 
‘short selling’, a practice which permits the sale of shares not owned by the vendor at 
the time of sale with the view of benefiting from a fall in the share price.    
 
ESMA can draft highly detailed technical and implementing standards which are later 
on adopted by the Commission under Article 290 and 291 TFEU (which concern, 
respectively, the adoption of delegated and implementing acts).  In relation to Article 
290 TFEU, the Commission sets out the conditions and specifies the criteria under 
which the agency can adopt further decentralized measures of a technical nature, 
but the drafting of the technical measure always comes from the agency. A very 
important issue here, from the accountability perspective, is whether the Commission 
has the sources, technical knowledge and scientific expertise required to control the 
appropriateness of the measures drafted by the agency. Regulation 1095/2010 
established the ESMA to rectify the significant shortcomings as regards financial 
regulation exposed by the financial crisis. In particular, pursuant to Article 10 and 15 
of Regulation 1095/2012, if the Commission decides not to adopt the measures 
drafted by ESMA then it is required to send them back to the Agency and explain 
why it has decided not to endorse them.  Interestingly enough and in order to secure 
the independence of the financial authorities there are extreme limitations imposed 
upon the Commission in this context: the preamble to Regulation 1095/2010 
provides that the Commission can depart from the draft measures prepared by the 
agency only if they are incompatible with EU law, violate the principle of 
proportionality or contradict the EU’s financial services legislation.  This can be 
compared with the subsequent Common Approach, where these principles govern 
the Commission’s control of the agency; here they effectively govern the agency’s 
control of the Commission, imposing the technical expertise of the former in place of 
the political discretion of the latter as the normal rule creating a significant 
accountability gap with long-lasting constitutional consequences. Overall, the 
depressing reality of the accountability mechanism set in place in relation to the 
ESAs is that it fails to address the challenge of identifying (any) balance between 
independence and accountability. But nevertheless, at least the current framework 
secures (rightly), in accordance with our proposed theorized framework as set out in 
section 2, a significant number of independent powers for agencies. 
 
The legislation being challenged by the UK was adopted on the basis of Article 114 
TFEU which allows for the enactment of harmonization measures necessary for the 
establishment and the functioning of the internal market.  The rationale for the 
adoption of the Regulation and in particular Article 28 is for the ESMA to interfere 
and issue binding measures against the financial institutions of the Member States to 
prohibit short selling in the event of a threat to the proper functioning and integrity of 
financial markets or to the stability of the whole or part of the EU’s financial system.  
The ESMA has wide discretionary power to issue such bans, and it is the only 
adjudicator of whether such a threat exists.  
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The UK raised four arguments. First of all, it argued that ESMA is given political 
powers which entail policy choices to adopt legally binding measures vis-a-vis the 
financial institutions of the Member States.  These powers do not fit well with the old 
Meroni line of case law which states that delegation to autonomous bodies is 
considered to be acceptable as long as Commission retains control powers to 
monitor how the agency is carrying out its tasks.  According to the Meroni line of 
reasoning, the conferment of broad discretionary power, reconciling competing 
public interests, to an EU agency cannot be justified on the basis of scientific 
expertise.  However, in the ESMA judgment, the Court of Justice ruled that the 
parent EU legislation, and the delegated and implementing acts adopted pursuant to 
that legislation by the Commission, sufficiently circumscribed ESMA’s powers.  
 
Secondly, the UK argued that the power for ESMA to ban short-selling breached the 
principle in Romano62 that the EU legislature could not delegate the power to adopt 
‘quasi-legislative measures of general application’. However, the Court ruled that 
Romano did not add anything to Meroni, noting in particular that the Treaty provides 
for agencies to adopt measures of general application.  
 
Thirdly, the UK argued that Articles 290 and 291 TFEU were in effect exclusive, 
ruling out a contrario the delegation of powers like the short-selling ban to EU 
agencies and fourthly that Article 114 TFEU is not the correct legal basis. In the 
Court’s view, the Treaty (in particular, the rules on judicial review) presupposed that 
agencies could adopt binding acts, and the provision allowing ESMA to ban short 
selling had to be seen in its overall legal context.   
 
What is the impact of the ruling on accountability? The Court’s ruling gives significant 
emphasis to judicial accountability, for instance, the fact that the measures adopted 
by the EU financial agencies are subject to judicial review under Article 263 (4) 
TFEU.  However, decentralized and implementing technical standards drafted by the 
EU financial agencies are subject to the Commission’s endorsement and although 
they constitute the basis for the adoption of the final act by the Commission they are 
technically and legally preparatory documents and as such they are excluded, in 
principle, from judicial scrutiny.  Additionally, non-privileged applicants, such as 
financial institutions negatively affected by any ban adopted by ESMA, would not be 
in a position to satisfy the EU’s locus standi requirements.63 They may be excluded 
from direct actions under Article 263 (4) TFEU on the basis that the ban adopted still 
entails separate implementing measures within the meaning of the Telefonica 
judgment.64 With great respect to the judgment, since the founding Regulation of the 
ESMA limits the power of the Commission to proceed with the drafting of technical 
standards or to amend them,65 the ruling secures independent technocratic powers 
and in effect unilaterally empowers EU financial agencies with wide political 
decisions which entail policy choices. More importantly, the absence of sufficient 
follow-up to the Common Approach means that the Agency’s actions to this end are 
not subject to sufficient political accountability either. The wider implications of the 
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judgment and also of the current framework establishing the agencies seem to 
suggest what has already pointed out in the literature that ‘in any event, it is clear 
that EU independent agencies are independent in the sense of being relatively free 
of control by any other organs of the [Union]’.66 Independent powers exercised by 
the authorities are important, but nevertheless there is a pressing need to establish 
an accountability mechanism which will secure that the independent technocratic 
powers are executed in a way which secures accountability.  
 
Another accountability question: will the Commission or the agency be held 
responsible in cases where adverse consequences occur if the assessment by the 
agency proves to be wrong and has further financial repercussions? 67  The EU 
citizens are now experiencing the austerity measures along with the consequences 
of the financial distress upon the Union’s economy and the unprecedented level of 
the unemployment rate. There is at least some correlation that the decline of the 
economic activity comes from the ESAs’ financial regulation. Similarly, according to 
the ESMA judgment additional powers could be conferred upon agencies to adopt 
acts of general application outside the scope of Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, which 
provide for the accountability of the Commission’s adoption of delegated or 
implementing acts to the other EU institutions or the Member States respectively. 
The delegated and implementing acts of the Commission which detailed ESMA’s 
powers to adopt the short-selling bans were themselves drafted by ESMA.  
Therefore, the constraints on ESMA’s powers were in practice drafted by it and 
endorsed by the Commission. This raises long-lasting questions in relation to 
accountability of ESMA which the Court seemed, with all due respect, to ignore.   
 
Judicial accountability demands that EU measures are subject to judicial review as 
well as that the review is directed to the actual body that made the underlying 
substantive decision. In the wording of the judiciary: ‘as a general rule, actions must 
be directed against the body which enacted the contested measure, in other words, 
the [Union] institution, or body from which the decision emanated’.68 However, this 
approach is highly formalist: there are agencies such as the EMEA (the EU 
pharmaceuticals regulation agency) and the EU’s financial agencies where the final 
decision is taken by the Commission but the actual decision is de facto taken by the 
agency. Similarly, the founding regulations of the agencies are based on the 
assumption that the Commission will have to adopt the drafts prepared by either the 
EMEA or the financial agencies. The GC has already identified this accountability 
problem and ruled that in these circumstances for judicial review to be meaningful it 
will essentially need to cover the opinion of the agencies since it influences greatly 
and it is closely related to the final measure adopted by the Commission.69 This 
welcome judicial approach does mitigate the accountability problem in the short-
term. In the long-run; however there must be a legislative solution that will 
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correspond to the political reality of the highly influential decision-making exercised 
by the agencies. 
The Court’s ruling in ESMA is important given that it is the first case which deals with 
the powers of the newly created financial supervisory authorities. The judgment 
secures the independence of the authorities and empowers them with 
unprecedented autonomous powers in order to rectify the exposed shortcomings of 
the EU’s financial regulation. Further, the Court imposes no limitations whatsoever, 
on the wide discretionary powers granted upon the financial authorities by the 
legislature in order to be able to foresee and secure financial stability in the EU. 
Therefore, there are certain constitutional questions that need to be answered: who 
are these highly independent autonomous bodies answerable to? Independent 
scientific legitimacy and complex decision-making in the area of EU’s financial 
regulation can lead to short-term solutions but raises greatest constitutional concerns 
over their appropriateness and legitimacy of those rulings to the EU’s constitutional 
setting. Independent technocratic decision-making cannot be a legitimate justification 
for increasing the powers of the EU’s financial agencies, something which can only 
be accepted if there are control powers vested in the main EU institutions for 
securing the accountability of these EU agencies. In this regard, it was already 
emphasized that ‘European law is a victim of the crisis’ since the mushrooming of 
various independent bodies and the way the Court corresponded to this provide 
strong evidence that technocratic decision-making is the latest judicial justification as 
regards to the expansion of powers to bodies not mentioned in the Treaties. 70 On 
the whole, with all due respect, the Court’s judgment contributes little to remedy the 
lack of accountability of EU agencies.    
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Independent decentralized agencies have increasingly contributed to the EU 
regulatory area by playing a central role in the whole integration process. In doing 
so, they provided the internal market with appropriate credibility, supervision and 
scientific expertise. . At the same time, scientific legitimacy cannot constitute a basis 
for the exercise of public authority. Delegation of tasks entailing the exercise of wide 
discretionary powers would indeed breach the institutional balance provided by the 
Treaties. The Treaty of Lisbon attempted to rectify some of the accountability 
inadequacies by formally acknowledging agencies at the Treaty level. The latest 
contribution of the Court cannot be underestimated either. It has provided us with a 
contemporary reading of Meroni and clarified further the tasks that can be delegated 
to the new generation agencies. The Court has confirmed that the EP and the 
Council are empowered to control the acts drafted by agencies. Nevertheless, with 
all due respect, the Court seems to ignore that ESMA’s control powers were in fact 
drafted by ESMA itself, and therefore it overlooked the need to demand more 
intensive control to secure accountability in the field.  
 
Finally, we have identified that agencies’ regime needs to be revised with the aim to 
balance political neutrality (independence) with the requirements of accountability. 
There is a pressing constitutional requirement to secure that independent actors are 
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being held accountable by their political masters. It is however very early at this 
stage to say with certainty that the development of the Common Approach will 
secure accountability in this area. The Common Approach has the potential to 
enhance the accountability mechanisms by requiring all the decentralized agencies 
function under the same rules, ensuring a consistently high standard of 
accountability and independence. But nevertheless, the initial indication is that the 
institutions lack the political will to ensure that agencies are actually reformed in 
accordance with the same standard rules.  
